The Vision of Anglo-America


The US-UK Alliance and the Emerging Cold War, 1943-1946


“Ryan has written a lucid study.  More than some previous writers he has detailed long-term British desires to form the union, and he has given a systematic treatment of British attempts to influence public opinion in the United States.  The prose is lively, and he utilizes good quotes from primary documents.”  Journal of American History

“…Ryan makes effective use of evidence to demonstrate that the British role in the origins of the Cold War was related to her decline as a great power…”  International History Review

Ryan’s research on the British side is thorough, his analysis is generally balanced and perceptive, and he writes with grace and wit.”  Australasian Journal of American Studies

“It is valuable for its stress on the irony of British policy.  The UK threw itself upon the United States not out of fear of Russia…but out of fear for an Empire it could no longer sustain single handed.”  The Guardian

“…this is an impressive, well-written book that is right on the essentials and is a sharp prompt to further investigation.” American Historical Review

“Dr Ryan’s book demonstrate[s] how historians can set exemplary standards for the use of evidence and for the comprehensiveness of case studies….” Review of International Studies 

“Britain’s role in the beginning of the Cold War has been examined in such works as…(three studies named).  Ryan’s account, however, is the most thoroughly researched.” Choice

“As Ryan correctly remarks, the ‘special relationship’ was the product of British weakness.  The United States was called in to redress an international balance which, with the failure of appeasement and the collapse of France, had tipped decisively against Britain.” Reviews in American History


“Awakening one night, ‘with a sharp stab of almost physical pain,’ Winston Churchill realized that he might be dismissed as Prime Minister by Britain’s voters in the summer of 1945.  Brooding, he said ‘The power to shape the future would be denied me.  The knowledge and experience I had gathered, the authority and goodwill I had gained in so many countries, would vanish.’ But, in fact, even after his defeat at the polls, his influence on world affairs was far from spent. If his credit at home was limited for the time being, it remained vast in the United States, the largest unit of the English-speaking peoples, a community of which he often spoke, exaggerating its cohesiveness.”

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“Churchill and the government he headed were determined to maintain a relationship with the United States unique among sovereign powers. Specifically, their objectives…were to maintain indefinitely the wartime merger of military commands…. They hoped also for similar coordination within the foreign ministries of the two countries….In short, the policy of Churchill’s government, if successful, would have created in the international arena a new power, one made up of two nations.  It could appropriately be called ‘Anglo-America.’”