

Anglo-American Relations During the Polish Crisis in 1945: A Study of British Efforts to Shape American Policy toward the Soviet Union

HENRY B. RYAN

Cold War historiography, especially its American component, has greatly underplayed Britain's attempt to shape US policies toward the Soviet Union during the pre-Cold War era, the several years prior to the Truman Doctrine. To rectify that omission to some degree this article examines a brief period and a restricted segment of international activity—the Polish crisis from the Yalta Conference until the eve of the Potsdam meeting when the US and UK recognized Poland's provisional government.

The article concentrates on the Polish crisis for the light it sheds on both Soviet-American and Anglo-American affairs, especially the effort of the British government to toughen US-Soviet policy. The Polish question was not the only one on which the British felt that the Americans needed a firmer, more confrontative line. Others included Venezia Giulia, Romania, Greece, and the Allied Occupation Zones. Furthermore, British efforts to this end certainly were not limited to the approximately five months examined here, although they peaked then, especially on the Polish issue. By examining that issue during these months, however, one can study a microcosm of a greater British effort, one that began at least with the preparations for the Tehran Conference.

During the months between Yalta and Potsdam, the Polish question was a principal source of disagreement among the Big Three, but not the only one. The Soviet Union's near single-handed rule of Romania and the Kremlin's suspicion of Western duplicity in the Berne incident were among the other major sources of stress.¹

These crises, like that in Poland, shook Roosevelt's hopes for a triangular American-Russian-British power structure that would guarantee the peace when it finally came and helped eventually to alienate the American government from that of the USSR. On the other hand, they supported Churchill's case that peace depended mainly on a close and continuing Anglo-American link and on a firm US-UK stand vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This difference of view regarding the Big Three relationship caused tensions between the two Western allies from the time it became apparent at Tehran.²

Churchill's government had been involved in the Russo-Polish crisis since 1942 and frequently looked to the United States for support. Roosevelt, however, generally was reluctant to become greatly involved, fearing to alienate either Polish-American voters if concessions were made to Russian demands or the Soviet Union if they were not. Furthermore, the American administration wanted boundary questions,

prominent in the crisis, to be postponed until a peace conference (although it eventually relented regarding Poland's eastern frontier). Despite this aloofness, however, by the spring of 1945 and especially after the Yalta Conference, the United States found itself immersed in the Polish question.

Post-Yalta America has often been seen as the key Western force in this crisis, although a close look at the Anglo-American dimension of the dispute reveals the US to have been quite a reluctant dragon, particularly in comparison with its British ally. There is every reason to believe that Roosevelt, and probably Truman as well, would have allowed the Polish issues to be settled with much less confrontation and friction than actually resulted had they not been continually 'stiffened' by the British. There is also reason to believe that the British position on Poland was taken, not exclusively but in great part, out of the concern of Churchill, Eden and other Conservatives with the pending elections in Great Britain.

Yalta and after

The question of who would govern Poland had been a point of contention since early 1943 when it became likely that the Red Army would occupy that country. When, indeed, it entered Poland the Soviet Union established the Lublin Committee, a group of sympathetic Poles created to keep order in the areas that the Red Army captured and named after the city in which it was organized. Meanwhile, a rabidly anti-Russian emigre government in London expected to return home after the war. Its leadership of thousands of free Poles fighting with the Allies and with a powerful underground force in Poland lent weight to these expectations. Churchill often found himself in the troublesome position of mediating between rival Polish groups, 'whose hatreds', he once said, 'would eat into live steel',³ and also between the emigres and the Soviet government. His mediating continued at Yalta, where he and other Allied statesmen spent many hours discussing the questions of Poland's boundaries and haggling over formulas for its provisional government.⁴ They settled the matter of the eastern border, although the Polish emigres promptly denounced the agreement. The matter of the western frontier was put off until the Potsdam meeting.

Forming a new government for Poland, however, was an issue that agitated the Allies for approximately the next five months. At Yalta an arcane mechanism was devised to handle the question. It included a commission of three: Vyacheslav Molotov, Foreign Minister of the USSR; Averell Harriman, American ambassador to Moscow, and Archibald Clark Kerr, British ambassador to Moscow. These three were to select consultants who, along with them, would choose a Polish provisional government to rule until a permanent one could be elected. Much of the exacerbated diplomacy of the next five months focused on the following questions:

1. Was unanimous approval of the Big Three required for a consultant to be accepted?
2. Should the Lublin Committee have a voice in this selection and, if so, how great?
3. Should the provisional government be built around a Lublin Committee core?
4. Should British and American observers go to Poland to oversee conditions generally and/or to supervise eventual voting for a permanent government.⁵

In general, during the negotiations at Yalta the Americans were much more passive and willing to compromise with the Soviets than were the British. For example, when Molotov suggested that the provisional government be built around the Lublin Committee, the British, not the Americans, came up with the counterproposal that, in fact, was adopted, that is, to establish the commission of three to select consultants.⁶

Furthermore, the United States, much to the chagrin of British statesmen, was willing to drop written agreement that the eventual elections should be overseen by Allied observers. The British were not.⁷

Following the conference, Churchill was optimistic, although he told the Cabinet that everything depended on Stalin carrying out the agreements in good faith.⁸ Yet he may have harboured a sullen belief that a pusillanimous United States kept him from making better bargains. By 20 February 1945, when Prime Minister Fraser of New Zealand sent him a telegram criticizing the agreements, Churchill replied, 'We cannot go further in helping Poland than the United States is willing or can be persuaded to go'.⁹

By early March 1945 negotiations regarding the consultants were already deadlocked, and a flurry of triangular communication had begun between London and Washington and their representatives in Moscow.¹⁰ It included a stream of messages between Churchill and Roosevelt in which the prime minister pushed the president to be more forceful on the Polish issue than he had been before or than Churchill thought Great Britain could be alone.

Although he had been deeply involved in Polish matters for over two years, Churchill's interest now became pronounced. From the first, he and his government had worried about an expansion of Soviet influence in Europe, but at this point Churchill may very well have worried also about his own place in history and especially about his image in domestic British politics. With the end of the war in sight, certainly that with Germany, he knew that the coalition government soon would have to be dissolved and elections held in Britain. He had frequently explained Britain's entry into the war in terms of an obligation to Poland.¹¹ However much he exaggerated the point, that notion was widespread in Britain at the time. Now he was going to have to fight an election while Poland, after six years of war, remained under foreign and totalitarian control. Consequently, if Poland were to be 'lost', let it not be without the stoutest fight possible. Let it never be said, surely not on election eve, that Churchill ended this drama with a return to Munich.

Exactly such references to Munich had, in fact, figured prominently in comments within the British government about Poland. For example, in late 1943, when seeking Cabinet concurrence in accepting the Curzon Line in return for territorial and diplomatic compensation for Poland, Eden said that the Poles had 'the Munich precedent very much in mind . . . We should make it crystal clear that this settlement differs from Munich . . .'¹² Several months later Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, worrying about giving ground to the Soviets on Poland, exclaimed, 'What won't be said about "another Munich"!' ¹³ And following the Yalta Conference, Churchill optimistically told Cabinet members, 'Poor Neville Chamberlain believed he could trust Hitler. He was wrong. But I don't think I'm wrong about Stalin'.¹⁴ Finally in June 1945, just before the British elections, the Foreign Office told Clark Kerr that it was essential that His Majesty's Government not be charged with 'having followed the Munich pattern'.¹⁵

On 8 March Churchill wrote at length to the president about the Polish question, highlighting the problem with the Soviets. Among other things, he believed Molotov was forcing the Lublin Committee on the Western Allies by trying to give it both a veto regarding the consultants and the authority to determine the scope of Allied observers in Poland. Furthermore, he suspected the Soviet Foreign Minister was reluctant to accept as a consultant Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, one-time Polish emigre premier and quite moderate toward the Soviets, especially by emigre standards.¹⁶ The Western leaders regarded him not only as a good wartime ally but as a voice of reason in Polish affairs.

Churchill told Roosevelt:

The news from Moscow about Poland is . . . most disappointing . . . I am sure the only way to stop Molotov's tactics is to send a personal message to Stalin and in that message I must make clear what are the essential things we must have in this business if I am to avoid telling Parliament that we have failed . . . I hope you will be ready to send Stalin a similar message containing the same minimum requirements. I shall not send any message until I hear from you.¹⁷

He enclosed a draft communication to Stalin, which he hoped would serve as a model for a similar message from the president.

But Roosevelt was not ready yet for such a move. Never as hawkish as Churchill or, for that matter, as American representatives in Moscow, he told the prime minister that they should await the results of their ambassador's efforts before sending their own message.¹⁸

Churchill, disappointed by this reply, also felt that the positions the Americans planned to take with the Russians, especially calling for a political truce in Poland, were unrealistic and far too vague.¹⁹ Although the British eventually managed to strengthen and clarify American policy, Roosevelt continued to insist that negotiations be left to the ambassadors. Only when and if they failed should he and Churchill 'appeal to Marshal Stalin'.²⁰

Roosevelt feared that complaining directly to Stalin would disrupt the alliance, whereas Churchill maintained that it was the only way to solve their problems. He admitted to Roosevelt, however, that 'we can, of course, make no progress at Moscow without your aid', and thereupon reluctantly agreed to postpone addressing the Soviet leader. At the same time he expressed his concern about the adverse effect of Polish affairs on British public opinion.²¹

Meanwhile, Clark Kerr crafted a set of positions that he recommended for himself and Harriman,²² suggesting that they both tell the Kremlin much more specifically than the Americans had planned exactly how the Western Allies saw the Polish problem and how they thought the negotiations should proceed.²³ And, indeed, after close consultations between the State Department and the British embassy in Washington, it was instructions modelled on these recommendations that finally went out to the two ambassadors.²⁴ Churchill, delighted at this minor British triumph, pointed out gratefully that 'the United States have made a number of concessions to meet our views'.²⁵

But at the end of all their toils with 'positions' and 'instructions', the Westerners got only the back of the Kremlin hand for their pains. The Soviet government upheld steadfastly the supremacy of the Lublin Committee; it might be modified, but it would have to be the basis of a provisional government, and, furthermore, the Allies should consult with it when forming such a government.²⁶ By now the Kremlin also expressed 'amazement' that the British and Americans planned to send observers to Poland.

Meanwhile, London and Washington had heard the stunning news that Molotov would not be attending the San Francisco Conference, which was to be crucial in establishing the UN.²⁷ The State Department at once searched for ways to ease matters, including deferring the question of observers in Poland if need be,²⁸ but not Churchill. Pushed by Eden, he called for firmer stuff. The Foreign Secretary had told him, 'There should now be a message from you and President Roosevelt to Stalin . . . Finally, is it of any value to go to San Francisco in these conditions? How can we lay foundations of any new world order when Anglo-American relations with Russia are so completely lacking in confidence.'²⁹

Eden may not have realized it, but he had found the perfect way to heighten

American concern, a warning that the San Francisco Conference was endangered. Churchill, however, recognized it instantly and replied that the British should ask Americans 'whether they will now agree to a telegram from the President and me to Stalin'. He added. 'We cannot press the case against Russia beyond where we can carry the United States. Nothing is more likely to bring them into line with us than any idea of the San Francisco conference being imperilled'. He asked Eden to draft a telegram along those lines which he could read to Roosevelt the next day.³⁰ The telegram not only laid out the prime minister's fears regarding parliamentary reaction and public opinion, but excoriated the Soviets to a degree that was new in these communications.³¹ 'Surely we must not be manoeuvred into becoming parties to imposing on Poland, and on how much more of Eastern Europe, the Russian version of democracy', he said, 'but I am convinced it is no use trying to argue this any further with Molotov. In view of this, is it not now the moment for a message from us both on Poland to Stalin?' Finally, he stressed the jarring fact that Molotov intended to be absent from the meeting at San Francisco. Knowing that the creation of the UN was the centrepiece of Roosevelt's diplomacy, he asked whether great power unity were not required to avoid 'building the whole structure of future world peace on foundations of sand?' Then in a separate message he outlined the Western case as he thought it might be put to Stalin.³²

Churchill guessed correctly. His messages to the president drew the reply he had been seeking for the better part of a month. 'I agree with you . . . the time has come to take up directly with Stalin the broad aspects of the Soviet attitude . . .' Roosevelt would send a draft.³³

Churchill's idea of what he and the president should say to Stalin was, according to Eden, 'a good deal rougher in tone' than Roosevelt's.³⁴ For even now, although agreeing to approach the Russian leader directly, Roosevelt took a milder view of the entire crisis. He told Churchill:

You will recall that the agreement on Poland at Yalta was a compromise between the Soviet position that the Lublin Government should merely be 'enlarged' and our contention that we should start with a clean slate and assist in the formation of an entirely new Polish Government. The wording of the resulting agreement reflects this compromise but if we attempt to evade the fact that we placed, as clearly shown in the agreement, somewhat more emphasis on the Lublin Poles than on the other two groups from which the new Government is to be drawn I feel we will expose ourselves to the charge that we are attempting to go back on the Crimean decision.³⁵

Nonetheless, Churchill was delighted to have Roosevelt's agreement to contact Stalin. He quickly approved the president's draft, although not before adding a few stiffening suggestions, particularly that no one of the three nations should veto another's candidates to consult on the formation of the Polish government.³⁶

Roosevelt's message to Stalin is frequently cited as an example of his post-Yalta disillusionment with the Kremlin, but rarely considered in the context of Anglo-American as well as Soviet-American relations. It opened, 'I cannot conceal from you the concern with which I view the development of events of mutual interest since our fruitful meeting at Yalta'.³⁷ In very reasonable tones, it then expressed the points upon which the president felt misunderstanding existed and suggested solutions. These included a truce among political factions in Poland and agreement for British and American observers to go there.

At the same time Churchill sent Stalin a rather more peppery message but to the same effect,³⁸ meanwhile telling Roosevelt, 'I am delighted with our being in such perfect step. I have bunged off my 929 to the Bear'.³⁹

Stalin, however, refused to budge on almost any point. Above all, the Lublin Committee, which he was now calling the Provisional Polish Government, had to be the basis of any new government.⁴⁰ He made one concession. He would 'influence the Provisional Polish Government to remove its objections against the invitation of Stanislaw Mikolajczyk', to be a consultant. First, however, Mikolajczyk would have to declare publicly his support for the Yalta agreements, which he had once denounced because of their Russo-Polish border provisions, and, also, state his desire for friendly Soviet-Polish relations. Stalin would not, however, countenance Allied observers in Poland, as the Allies, at British insistence, continued to propose.⁴¹

The early days of the Truman presidency

Churchill and the Foreign Office had established a bridgehead with Roosevelt. They had brought him at least to the point where he would express concern to Stalin over Soviet diplomacy. After Roosevelt's death, they attempted to go further with Truman who was nearly as new to foreign affairs as he was to the presidency. Highly impressed with the importance of the presidential office, he assumed it at a challenging time, Soviet intransigence from the Western point of view then being at a peak. Nonetheless, he was convinced that Russian help would be needed in the Pacific war.⁴² This conviction did not prevent him from exploding violently at Molotov before the San Francisco Conference, but it did, perhaps along with other considerations, prevent him from heeding Churchill's persistent calls to push the Western armies eastward beyond the demands of military necessity. Nor would he agree to leave US forces in pre-designated Soviet zones until political concessions were gained from the Russians, as Churchill suggested.⁴³

The day after Roosevelt's death, two telegrams arrived in London from Truman, one with a draft message to Stalin.⁴⁴ Answering Churchill's expressions of condolence, Truman acknowledged that there were 'urgent problems requiring our immediate and joint consideration', and said 'I have in mind the pressing and dangerous problem of Poland and the Soviet attitude toward the Moscow negotiations'.⁴⁵ Seeing little ground for optimism, the president felt nonetheless that he and Churchill 'should have another go' at Stalin.⁴⁶

Churchill seemed delighted. He instructed Eden, then in Washington, to concur in Truman's message to Stalin and agreed to put off, if necessary, a parliamentary debate about Poland which would undoubtedly worsen relations with the USSR.⁴⁷ He said, 'It would be the greatest mistake not to join in with the new regime at the earliest moment especially when they are so stiff and strong'.⁴⁸

Meanwhile, an extremely important event in the affairs of the Big Three occurred. Upon FDR's death Stalin asked Harriman what he could do to help Truman, and the ambassador answered that he could send Molotov first to Washington and then to the San Francisco Conference.⁴⁹ Stalin agreed to do so, to the enormous relief of the State Department and the White House, while Churchill grumbled that the Soviet leader was simply retracting a move he never should have made.⁵⁰

At almost the same time another event of signal importance occurred in the Polish crisis. It was learned that sixteen prominent leaders of nearly all political parties in Poland had gone to the Soviet Union apparently for consultations.⁵¹ Eden and other top Foreign Office officials believed they had gone to negotiate with the Russians about a new Polish government, which might be acceptable, they thought, if Mikolajczyk and one or two others from London were included. Eden said, however, 'we should require time to consider the matter and to consult the Americans, who,

on form, would probably be disposed to accept any respectable compromise'.⁵² Before long, however, it became apparent that the sixteen Poles, far from forming a new government, were in Soviet prisons charged with various subversive activities.

Meanwhile, Stettinius believed that the Polish issue would be ameliorated when the Big Three Foreign Secretaries met in connection with the San Francisco Conference, and he suggested Churchill point this out in the House of Commons. Eden, who remained in the US from the time of Roosevelt's funeral until he left the conference approximately a month later, reported that he had agreed but had also told Stettinius 'that it would do the Russians no harm to know how deep was our concern at the failure of the Moscow Commission thus far to make progress on the basis of the Yalta decisions'. He told the American Secretary of State that the US and UK 'must keep a steady pressure on the Russians', and that there was 'no justification yet for optimism'. 'I agree emphatically', he said, 'that we should not allow Molotov's tardy mission in any way to weaken our united pressure'.⁵³

Eden made sure that such opinions were registered wherever possible with the American government at this crucial time in the formation of its thought and policy. Furthermore, he was once directly responsible for persuading the president to toughen the American line. As a result of his objections, the US reversed its position of agreeing to only three Polish consultants from London but five from Poland and giving the Soviets and/or the Lublin Committee the right to select the latter group.⁵⁴

Just before Molotov left the Soviet Union to go to the United States, the Kremlin made one of those stunning moves typical by now of its policy in the Polish matter. It announced that it was preparing to enter a treaty of mutual assistance with the Lublin Committee, thereby strengthening the latter's claims to be the legitimate government of Poland. Both Eden and Stettinius agreed that they could not let this move go unnoticed, and both wired their representatives in Moscow to express surprise and to ask that the treaty be deferred until they could discuss it with Molotov.⁵⁵ Whatever the Soviet government gained by this move, it clearly worsened its relations with the Western powers, seeming to deal them an almost gratuitous insult, perhaps less by the act itself than by its timing.

The Gathering for the San Francisco Conference

The months immediately after Yalta were among the most significant and sinister for subsequent East-West relations, with tension peaking during the latter part of April just before the San Francisco Conference. With the Soviets alienating the new US administration and with reports of their stubbornness beginning to worry the American public, it was a perfect moment for the British to stress the need for firmness and for Anglo-American solidarity and they did it admirably.

But before going further, it should be noted that Truman, almost surely uncertain still of the line his administration would take toward the Soviet Union,⁵⁶ was, in this period, subjected to an extraordinary barrage of hard-line advice, much of it from individuals who were in the United States for the conference. These included three especially – Eden, who then took as tough a line towards the Kremlin as any Western statesman, Harriman, and John Deane, head of the US military mission in the Soviet Union. The latter two, fresh from the frustrations of dealing with the Soviet bureaucracy, called for the US to be reasonable but firm in relations with the USSR.

During this pre-conference period there was a series of meetings in Washington with great significance for the future. The first was on 20 April between Harriman and Truman, and attended by Stettinius, Joseph C. Grew, Undersecretary of State,

and Charles Bohlen, then Assistant to the Secretary of State. Harriman presented Soviet policy in an extremely unfavourable light, saying the West was faced with a 'barbarian invasion of Europe', including 'secret police, extinction of free speech, etc.' but that it still 'could arrive at a workable basis with the Russians . . .' The president said at one point that, if the Polish issue were not settled satisfactorily, American adherence to the UN would not pass the Senate, which he intended to tell Molotov in words of one syllable.⁵⁷

The next day Eden told Stettinius that 'everything turned on the Polish question' which 'must be discussed first'. 'Some progress', he said, 'was absolutely essential before San Francisco if the conference was to be a success'.⁵⁸ Stettinius assured him that the president would make this clear to Molotov. Truman himself told Eden, Stettinius and Harriman before Molotov arrived that he thought it very important that the three foreign secretaries make headway regarding Poland, repeating that he intended to tell Molotov so 'in words of one syllable'. Success or failure at San Francisco, he said, much to Eden's satisfaction, would largely depend on progress on the Polish question during the next twenty-four hours, and he offered to do whatever he could to help the foreign secretaries. Eden, according to his report, told the president that he was glad that he planned to speak plainly and welcomed 'any step that would serve to impress on Molotov the importance of the issues at stake'. The Foreign Secretary later told Churchill that 'the American attitude at the moment is firm and there is no doubt that Russian action in completing treaty at this moment with Warsaw Government has stiffened opinion here'.⁵⁹

Stettinius told the president that Anglo-American relations had never been closer, and Truman replied that he intended to do everything in his power to continue that state of affairs. One could well argue that, in view of his actions on nuclear energy, lend-lease, Palestine and other matters, he quickly forgot this resolution, but at the time it seemed genuine. Eden then struck deftly at the American government's constant fear of seeming to connive with the British against the Soviets, something which had been expressed continually to Whitehall by Roosevelt's administration. In Eden's words:

We then reverted to Russian affairs, and I said that in time past there had been tendency to think that we and the Americans should be careful not to appear to be "ganging up" against Russia. I thought, however, that with conditions as they were now, it was easy to exaggerate this danger, and that on big issues when our policies were really at one, we should get better results that way.

Harriman interjected to say that he entirely agreed with my reading of the situation and the President said that this was (his) view also.

We are going to have a tough negotiation with Molotov, but at least the latter should be confronted with a firm Anglo-American front.⁶⁰

Churchill replied that he was in full accord with all that Eden was doing 'to stiffen the Americans and back them up to the hilt'.⁶¹

Following Molotov's arrival, two Foreign Secretaries' meetings on the Polish question, held on 22 and 23 April, produced no results. After the first Eden told Stettinius that if they made no progress the next morning he thought that the president should send for the three of them, receive their report 'and himself speak plainly to M. Molotov'. 'The President', he told London, 'has now agreed to this and will be ready to receive the three of us at twelve thirty tomorrow'.⁶² After discussion with his aides, however, the president determined to see Molotov alone on the evening of 23 April, and, in Eden's words 'explain to him in blunt terms the effect of his attitude on future cooperation between the Great Powers . . . Americans appear to

have some hope that this conversation may produce a more reasonable attitude by Russia'.⁶³

The date 23 April 1945 is sometimes considered pivotal in the Truman administration and in the destinies of East and West for another reason. It is seen as the day that Truman determined in a meeting of high-level US officials to confront the Soviets.⁶⁴ One should be careful, however, not to overemphasize the significance of that one meeting. As we have seen, Truman was indeed in a mood to be firm even before then and was being urged in that direction by the high-ranking, hard-line team of British and American diplomats that descended on Washington at the time. Nevertheless, he and his government did not march from then on in a direct line toward confrontation but tergiversated until 1947, when in March he asked Congress to fund aid to Greece and Turkey and in so doing pronounced what has become known as the Truman Doctrine.

The notorious meeting of 23 April between Truman and his advisers was held at 2 p.m. at the White House, and, besides the president, included Stettinius, Stimson, Forrestal, Leahy, Marshall, King, James C. Dunn (Assistant Secretary of State), Harriman, Deane and Bohlen.⁶⁵ Stettinius began the discussion by stating that 'a complete deadlock' had been reached on Poland and that the Soviets were clearly trying to force the United States and Britain to recognize a puppet government there. Truman said he felt that 'our agreements with the Soviet Union so far had been on a one way street and that could not continue; it was now or never. He intended to go on with plans for San Francisco and if the Russians did not wish to join us they could go to hell'.⁶⁶

That evening Truman had his extraordinary meeting with Molotov in which he did indeed talk to him in words of one syllable, telling him, among other things, of US disappointment with the Soviet position in Poland.⁶⁷ Although Molotov insisted that the USSR desired to carry out the Yalta agreements, Truman disagreed, and, according to his memoirs, the interview ended with Molotov saying 'I have never been talked to like that in my life', and Truman replying, 'Carry out your agreements and you won't get talked to like that'.⁶⁸

A message for Stalin which Truman handed Molotov that evening said that the US and British governments had gone as far as they could in meeting the Soviets and urged him to accept the proposals in Truman's earlier joint message with Churchill.⁶⁹ It went on to say that failure to carry out the Crimean decisions would shake confidence in the ability of the three allies to collaborate in the future.⁷⁰ Eden thoroughly approved of Truman's stance, and later, from San Francisco, told Churchill, 'I entirely agree about the importance of stiffening the Americans in their attitude to Russia about Poland. Russian behaviour in today's Steering Committee of the Conference, which could hardly have been worse, is having an excellent educative effect upon all'.⁷¹

Meanwhile, on 24 April, Stalin made it clear that, regardless of Western notes and scoldings, he was not changing the Soviet position, that is, that the Lublin Committee should form the 'main part' of a new regime in Poland where a friendly government was as vital to the Soviet Union's security as a friendly one in Greece or Belgium was to Britain's.⁷² He concluded by suggesting the 'Yugoslav model', as the Kremlin had done before, a model which would give Soviet-backed candidates a majority in the Polish government. The proposal was rejected by both Churchill and Truman,⁷³ with Truman adding a refusal to invite Lublin Committee representatives to San Francisco as Molotov was suggesting.⁷⁴ Pleased with this staunch American position, Churchill told Truman that his government 'strongly approved of the lead he was taking on the Polish issue'.⁷⁵

But however much he admired Truman's firmness, Churchill continued his pressure, calling on the Americans not to join with his government in one of the most contentious issues of the Polish situation, the disappearance of the sixteen Poles. Repeated inquiries to the Kremlin about them had brought no information, and now that there finally was news it only caused further problems, for Molotov had told Stettinius on 3 May that the Poles had been arrested. The following day, Stettinius and Eden replied that the talks on Poland would have to be discontinued 'until they had an opportunity to consult with their Governments and to receive a full explanation from the Soviet Government . . .'.⁷⁶ Eden's memoirs give the impression that he took the lead in breaking off the talks and that Stettinius concurred.⁷⁷

Churchill, upon hearing the news, told the president that he was . . . 'most concerned about the fate of the 15 (sic) Polish representatives', and added, '. . . you and I should consult together very carefully upon this matter'. He hoped that the Foreign Secretary on his way back to Britain could discuss it with Truman.⁷⁸ To Eden he said, 'the perfidy by which these Poles were enticed into a Russian conference and then held fast', if published on the authority of the Western Allies, 'would produce a primary change in the entire structure of world forces. We must make sure that the United States are with us'.⁷⁹

But immediately following the San Francisco Conference, the Americans suggested renewing efforts similar to those that had gone before. Stettinius and Harriman proposed to Eden that Harriman and Clark Kerr stop off in London on their way back to Moscow. There, with Churchill and Mikolajczyk, they should try to agree on the form a reorganized Polish government should take and on names of Poles to be included in it. The two ambassadors would then discuss the matter directly with Stalin.⁸⁰

Eden was unenthusiastic about the plan and doubted that Mikolajczyk would be interested while his friends were in Soviet gaols.⁸¹ In London also enthusiasm was restrained. Orme Sargent, Deputy Undersecretary in the Foreign Office, said that, perhaps worst of all, 'the proposal (was) disquieting evidence of weakening on the part of Mr Stettinius and Mr Harriman',⁸² He thereupon prepared a powerful argument for Eden to use in talks with Truman, which Churchill sent off without changing a word. It began, 'American proposal . . . is futile if not dangerous', and predicted that the ambassadors would simply end up talking to Molotov whereupon, after some 'stone-walling' by him, the Americans would agree to something on the Yugoslav pattern. It added, 'Please leave Mr Stettinius and Mr Harriman in no doubt of my (Churchill's) views and express them forcibly to President Truman on your way through Washington. The Embassy in Washington should also be guided by them in discussions with officials at the State Department'.⁸³

The period of the San Francisco Conference marked a high point in Washington's receptivity to British counsel, particularly to urgent appeals for solidarity and firmness towards the Soviets. It was, however, a fleeting moment. Truman quickly returned to efforts to mollify the Russians and continued them until Potsdam, when at last it seemed likely that the war could be won in the Far East without Soviet help. Furthermore his administration, although inclining toward an adversary position vis-à-vis the USSR, did not return to the tough stance of April 1945 until he pronounced the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. In short, April 1945, did not, as has sometimes been suggested, mark a turning-point in American policy but rather a short-lived aberration in a Roosevelt-Truman policy flow that moved slowly, unevenly but continuously toward confrontation.

Between San Francisco and Potsdam

The American administration seemed determined to have the issue of Poland's government solved before the Potsdam Meeting, scheduled for mid-July, and was much more willing than its British counterpart to make concessions to this end. Although there may have been little Churchill could do to slow the process, his efforts to 'stiffen' the US Government nevertheless reached a crescendo in the two-month period from mid-May to mid-July. Besides Poland, the issues on which he was prodding his American ally included Trieste, or more accurately the province of Venezia Giulia, and the eastward positioning of US and British troops.

In the latter part of May, however, his campaign received a damaging blow when he learned that Truman might meet alone with Stalin before the next Big Three meeting. The idea was put to Churchill by Joseph Davies, a former US ambassador to the Soviet Union, and drew a powerful reaction, that is, if Stalin and Truman met without him, he would not go to a subsequent conference of the three great allies. When Truman heard this he denied ever intending to meet alone with Stalin except informally and in the context of a Big Three meeting.⁸⁴

The episode must have been particularly irritating to Churchill, especially because he had proposed that he and Truman should have a meeting alone before the next conference of the three leaders. Truman refused for fear of appearing to 'gang up' on the Russians. (Churchill had made a similar proposal before both the Tehran and Yalta Conferences and had been turned down each time by Roosevelt for the same reason.)⁸⁵

At nearly the same time that he sent Davies to London, Truman took the next major move in regard to Poland by calling Harry Hopkins from retirement and suggesting he go to Moscow, see Stalin, and try to straighten out all the questions that were vexing the alliance. Nothing about the mission, however, had been said to the British, a matter of some concern to the Foreign Office, wanting as it did a boycott of negotiations with the Soviets until the sixteen Poles were released. In addition, Whitehall feared that the Americans might be content simply with 'papering over the cracks', as Woodward puts it, in order to get an agreement, in which case there would be little that Great Britain by itself could do to compel the Russians to change their policy.⁸⁶

During the Hopkins-Stalin talks, obstacles of many weeks' duration seemed to vanish.⁸⁷ Names of consultants were quickly agreed upon, a group Clark Kerr described as being about as good as could be hoped for.⁸⁸ Truman was delighted and told Churchill 'Harry Hopkins has just sent me a most encouraging message about the Polish situation'. He then listed the consultants, and asked for approval by both Churchill and Mikolajczyk. Regarding the sixteen imprisoned leaders, he said most were charged only with operating illegal radio transmitters and that Hopkins was pressing to get amnesty for them.⁸⁹ Churchill, caught up by Truman's enthusiasm, wired Hopkins saying 'You are doing splendid work',⁹⁰ and told Truman 'Harry Hopkins has made very remarkable progress at Moscow and I am entirely in sympathy with what he has already achieved'.⁹¹

The Foreign Office, however, none too pleased with Hopkins's mission in any event, quickly dampened Churchill's spirits. Sir Ronald Campbell,⁹² speaking for Eden, told the prime minister that there was no reason to be 'too elated' because 'no real progress' was involved 'towards securing a representative government in Poland'.⁹³

Thereupon, Halifax was instructed to tell the State Department that, without minimizing Hopkins's 'admirable work', the Foreign Office felt little was accomplished until the Russians allowed a Polish regime which would assure elections on a 'proper basis'.

The Western powers must continue their pressure on the Kremlin, the Foreign Office said, and must avoid giving the impression to either the Russians or to world opinion that 'the Polish question is solved'.⁹⁴ Churchill sent this same message to the president with additional words of his own, saying, among other things, 'I cannot feel . . . that we can regard this as more than a milestone in a long hill we ought never to have been asked to climb'.⁹⁵

Discouraging news reached London on 6 June, however, when Clark Kerr reported that Stalin told Hopkins only four new ministers needed to be brought into the new Polish government.⁹⁶ It was, in effect, the Yugoslav model with a vengeance, giving only about 15 percent of the government to non-Lublin Poles. Until then it had been assumed by Western officials that even the Yugoslav model meant that from one-third to two-fifths of the ministers would be persons outside the Lublin group. But, as Richard Law, Parliamentary Undersecretary in the Foreign Office, pointed out, the worst feature 'from our own Parliamentary point of view' was the American willingness to resume discussions before the sixteen Poles were released.⁹⁷ By then, however, Churchill, too, had reluctantly agreed to discussions on this basis.

Meanwhile, the Foreign Office told Clark Kerr that by concurring in the list put forward by Stalin without further preliminary conditions the Western powers had made a 'marked retreat'. Furthermore, by agreeing that all invitations must have unanimous consent of Moscow Commission members, they had in effect accepted a Russian veto. It then told him to reject any pre-arranged formula or percentage. Furthermore, it showed its concern for domestic reaction to the Polish issue with this telling comment:

the one absolutely essential requirement, if any settlement reached in Moscow is to be accepted by Parliament and public opinion here, is that His Majesty's Government should not lay themselves open to the charge of having followed the Munich pattern and imposed, for the sake of our relations with the Soviet Government, on an unwilling Polish people a settlement agreed upon in advance among the Great Powers.⁹⁸

When Hopkins returned home he indicated that he had felt uncomfortable because Truman had sent him without discussing his mission in advance with Churchill, who was 'disturbed about the whole business'.⁹⁹ Why Truman did this is unclear. Possibly he feared Churchill would try to alter or stall the mission, in which Hopkins took a much more conciliatory line than the British advocated.

By early June, when Hopkins left Moscow, the Big Three governments had agreed on the Polish consultants. From then on things moved swiftly, and by 22 June Clark Kerr wired indicating that agreement on a provisional Polish government had been reached.¹⁰⁰ On 2 July Truman told Churchill that, according to Harriman, the provisional regime had been established 'in conformity with the Crimean decision' and that the American government was ready to recognize it. 'Any further delay', he said, 'would serve no useful purpose and might even prove embarrassing to both of us. I hope, therefore, you will agree to accord recognition simultaneously with us.'¹⁰¹

Churchill and the Foreign Office had, in fact, hoped to withhold recognition until the provisional government had pledged itself to hold free elections. Nevertheless, they concurred, and on 5 July 1945 both the US and UK recognized the new government.¹⁰²

Conclusion

Even acknowledging that Churchill and Eden wanted to limit Soviet power and influence, especially in Europe, one must marvel at the fight they waged over Poland,

where the Soviet Union obviously had not only strong interests but the means to make its will prevail.

And here is another lacuna of Cold War historiography. While the effect of the American elections on Roosevelt's policy toward Poland has frequently been pointed out, the effect of the British elections on the policy of Churchill and Eden has been virtually ignored, although it could well be argued that these elections were far more significant in the way matters developed.

Churchill frequently remarked that Great Britain had gone to war for Poland, yet that nation still remained under foreign totalitarian domination. In addition, the eastern boundary that he agreed to at Yalta bore an uncomfortable resemblance to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Line of 1939, while Polish compensation in the west could be seen simply as an agreement that moved Soviet influence closer to London. Churchill and Eden, therefore, were keenly aware that charges of appeasement were in the wind, that in some quarters Yalta and Munich were being equated, and that Poland might become their Czechoslovakia. For politicians soon to fight an election with mainly wartime leadership and diplomatic achievements to point to, the Polish question could be vital. Regardless of its motives, however, the determination of the Coalition government to present a firm Western front to the Russians on the Polish issue, and the consequent frequent 'stiffening' of its trans-Atlantic ally, must be counted among the forces that shaped East-West relations in the postwar world.

NOTES

1. For principal correspondence on the Romanian affair, including that between London and Washington, see *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Department of State (hereafter *FRUS*), 1945, vol. v, 464-646; on the Berne incident, see vol. iii, 722-58.
2. For an account of Churchill's displeasure in this regard at Tehran see Lord Moran, *Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival, 1940-1965* (paperback, London, 1968), 154-66, but especially 157. One can also sense some of his pique in his own description of the conference in *The Second World War* (six vols, London, 1948-54, hereafter cited as *Churchill*), vol. v, 331.
3. PREM 3 (356/9), 810, minute, 9 March 1945. (All archives cited in this article are in the Public Record Office in London.)
4. For the official British record of Yalta see Cab.66, vol.63 W.P. (45)157, 12 March 1945 and PREM 3 (51/1-10). Additional official correspondence regarding the conference can be found in PREM 3 (356/3). American records and correspondence are in separate volumes of *FRUS* entitled *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta*. Soviet records, mainly of heads-of-government sessions, are collected in *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences: Documents* (Progress Publishers, Moscow).
5. A good source for details on these negotiations is Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War* (5 vols, London, 1970-76, hereafter cited as Woodward), vol.iii, 245-77.
6. Cab. 66, vol. 63, W.P. (45) 157, 12 March 1945, conference record, 61.
7. *Ibid.*, 84, 80.
8. Woodward, vol. iii, 275-76.
9. PREM 3 (356/4), 124.
10. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 134-76, *passim*.
11. Churchill, vol. vi, 504, note, Churchill to Joseph Davies, 27 May 1945, for example.
12. Cab. 66, vol. 43, W.P. (43) 528, 22 November 1943.
13. *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945* (London, 1971, hereafter cited as *Cadogan's Diaries*), 609.
14. Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace* (Boston, 1977), 65, who cites Hugh Dalton's diary for 23 February 1945.
15. PREM 3 (356/13), 1079, telegram, 9 June 1945.
16. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 152, telegram, Grew to Schoenfeld, 9 March 1945. Cab 65, vol. 49, W.M. (45) 26th conclusions, minute 5, confidential annex.
17. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 147, telegram, 8 March 1945.

18. *Ibid.*, 157, telegram, Roosevelt to Churchill, 11 March 1945.
19. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 150, telegram, Grew to Harriman, 8 March 1945; 153 telegram, Churchill to Roosevelt, 10 March 1945; 155, telegram, Roosevelt to Churchill, 11 March 1945. PREM 3 (356/9), 810, minute, 9 March 1945.
20. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 158, telegram, Roosevelt to Churchill, 12 March 1945. Text also PREM 3 (473), 366.
21. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 158, telegram to Roosevelt, 13 March 1945. Text also in PREM 3 (473), 362. There was additional correspondence between the two on this subject. See *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 163 and 170 or PREM 3 (473) 357 and 353 for an exchange of telegrams on 15 and 16 March. Finally Churchill, aware of how hard he was pushing Roosevelt, sent a fence-mending cable, hoping he was not becoming a bore, and reaffirming their friendship, which, he said, 'is the rock on which I build for the future of the world . . .' See PREM 3 (473), 350.
22. PREM 3 (356/9), 751, telegram, Churchill to Roosevelt, 16 March 1945. Text also *FRUS* 1945, vol. v, 170.
23. PREM 3 (356/9), 743, telegram, Halifax to FO, 17 March 1945.
24. *Ibid.*, 747, telegram, Roosevelt to Churchill, 18 March 1945. For text of final instructions see *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 172, telegram, Acheson to Harriman, 18 March 1945.
25. PREM 3 (356/9), 738, minute to Eden, 19 March 1945.
26. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 176, telegram, Harriman to Sec. State, 23 March 1945.
27. PREM 3 (473), 322, copies of messages between Roosevelt and Stalin repeated to Churchill, 29 March 1945.
28. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 184, telegram, Grew to Harriman, 27 March 1945.
29. PREM 3 (356/9), 722, minute to Churchill, 24 March 1945.
30. PREM 3 (356/9), 718, minute to Eden, 24 March 1945.
31. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 185, telegram, Churchill to Roosevelt, 27 March 1945. Text also in PREM 3 (473), 326.
32. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 187, telegram, Churchill to Roosevelt, 27 March 1945.
33. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 189, telegram, Roosevelt to Churchill, 29 March 1945.
34. PREM 3 (356/9), 548, record of telephone message, Eden to Churchill, 30 March 1945.
35. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 189, telegram of 29 March 1945. Text also in PREM 3 (473), 317. The 'two groups' Roosevelt refers to in addition to Lublin were the emigré government and all others.
36. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 190, telegram, Churchill to Roosevelt, 30 March 1945.
37. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 194, telegram, Roosevelt to Stalin, 1 April 1945. Text also PREM 3 (472), 314.
38. *Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt, and Truman* (Moscow, 1957), part i, 310. He sent a draft to Roosevelt before cabling Stalin. See *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 191.
39. PREM 3 (356/5), 316, telegram, 1 April 1945.
40. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 201, telegram, Stalin to Roosevelt, 7 April 1945.
41. *Ibid.*, 204, telegram, Stalin to Churchill, 7 April 1945. Text also in PREM 3 (473), 262.
42. Truman, vol. i, 256, 293, 349, 421. Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York, 1948), 901.
43. Churchill, vol. vi, 448, 498. Truman, vol. i, 76, 244, 245. PREM 3 (356/13), 1123, telegram to Truman, 4 June 1945.
44. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 219, or PREM 3 (473), 251, draft message, Truman to Stalin.
45. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 211, telegram, 13 April 1945. Text also in PREM 3 (473), 257.
46. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 211, telegram, 13 April 1945. Text also in PREM 3 (473), 254. Note that Truman sent two telegrams to Churchill on this subject on the same day.
47. PREM 3 (356/5), 236, telegram to Eden, 15 April 1945.
48. PREM 3 (356/5), 217, minute to Cadogan, 14 April 1945. See also *Cadogan's Diaries* 728, entry for 14 April 1945.
49. PREM 3 (356/5), 232, telegram, Clark Kerr to FO, 14 April 1945. See also W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946* (London, 1976), 441-43.
50. PREM 3 (356/5), 228, draft message to Eden, 15 April 1945.
51. Because at first it was assumed that the number was fifteen, communications on the matter may say fifteen or sixteen.
52. PREM 3 (356/7), 163, minute, Eden to Churchill, 19 April 1945.
53. PREM 3 (356/5), 213, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 15 April 1945.
54. PREM 3 (356/5), 203, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 14 April 1945. For Stalin's reference to the three and five formula see *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 201, or PREM 3 (356/5), 297, letter to Roosevelt, 7 April 1945.
55. PREM 3 (356/5), 160, telegram, Eden to Roberts, 17 April 1945, and *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 227, telegram, Sec. State to Kennan, 17 April 1945.
56. Truman's inexperience in international matters is shown clearly in chapters 2 and 3, vol. i, of his

- memoirs, *Year of Decisions*, in which he describes his efforts to inform himself about foreign policy as well as domestic issues.
57. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 231, memorandum of conversation by Bohlen. Regarding Truman's skimpy knowledge of foreign affairs, note that he told Stettinius on 21 April, the day before his first meeting with Molotov, that he was 'very hazy' about Yalta. See *The Diaries of Edward J. Stettinius Jr., 1943-1946*, T. M. Campbell and G. C. Herring (eds) (New York, 1975, hereafter cited as *Stettinius's Diaries*), 325.
 58. *Stettinius's Diaries*, 325, 327.
 59. PREM 3 (356/10), 918, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 22 April 1945.
 60. *Ibid.*
 61. *Ibid.*, 903, telegram, Churchill to Eden, 24 April 1945.
 62. *Ibid.*, 913, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 23 April 1945.
 63. *Ibid.*, 908, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 23 April 1945.
 64. See Brian Gardner, *The Wasted Hour* (London 1963), 164-65, for example. Walter LaFeber calls it 'a decisive meeting' in *America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-1975* (New York, 1976, 3rd ed.), 18.
 65. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 252, memorandum by Bohlen of the conversation.
 66. *Ibid.*
 67. See *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 256, for a record of the meeting made by Bohlen, who attended it.
 68. In his memoirs, Truman seems to have used the Bohlen record almost verbatim although this peppery closing to the meeting is not included in that record or in Bohlen's account in his memoirs. See *Truman's memoirs*, vol. i, 96-99, and Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929-1969* (London, 1973), 213.
 69. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 220. That message delivered 18 April stated in essence:
 - That the US and UK agreed that three leaders from the Lublin Committee, now being called the Warsaw Government, might be among the consultants.
 - That the Western Allies agreed that the Warsaw Government should play an important role in the provisional government.
 - That the real issue was whether or not the Warsaw Government had a veto right in respect to consultants.
 - That consultants from Warsaw might arrive first if that were desired (presumably by Moscow and Warsaw).
 - That the consultants should be able to suggest other consultants who might be invited.
 - That the US and UK could agree to no formulas for the provisional government before the consultations with the Poles, and that in no case would the Yugoslav precedent apply. In Yugoslavia Soviet-backed candidates had been granted a majority.
 - It then asked Stalin to re-read coordinated US-UK messages of 1 April 1945 which expressed Western resistance to an augmented role for the Warsaw Government either in the consultations or in the eventual provisional government. (See *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 193, 194, for these messages.)
 70. PREM 3 (356/10), 904, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 23 April 1945.
 71. *Ibid.*, 892, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 26 April 1945.
 72. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 263, telegram, Stalin to Truman, 24 April 1945.
 73. PREM 3 (356/10), 885, 870, 866, and 862 for development of Churchill's telegram to Stalin, which included a lengthy statement of the Western positions.
 74. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 280, telegram. Truman to Stalin, 4 May 1945, and 272, record of a meeting of the Foreign Secretaries and their aides, 2 May 1945.
 75. PREM 4 (27/10), 894, 25 April 1945.
 76. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, record of the meeting, 4 May 1945.
 77. Anthony Eden, *The Eden Memoirs—The Reckoning* (London, 1965), 536.
 78. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 284, telegram, 5 May 1945. Note that Churchill was still under the impression that fifteen, not sixteen, persons were involved.
 79. PREM 3 (356/2), 1007, telegram, 5 May 1945.
 80. PREM 3 (356/16), 1278, telegram, Eden to Churchill, 9 May 1945.
 81. *Ibid.*
 82. PREM 3 (356/16), 1271, minute, 11 May 1945.
 83. *Ibid.*, 1273, telegram, 12 May 1945.
 84. Churchill, vol. vi, 501, Truman, vol. 1, 288.
 85. In regard to Tehran see PREM 3 (471), 107, 100, 96; to Yalta see PREM 3 (473), 438, 436, 435. In the summer of 1942 Churchill was similarly chagrined to learn that Roosevelt hoped to meet with Stalin *à deux*, although Stalin let the matter languish, surely out of irritation at a delay in the invasion of France. Again Joseph Davies figured in the story, that time carrying Roosevelt's letter to Stalin suggesting the meeting. See *The Roosevelt Letters*, vol.iii, Elliott Roosevelt, ed. (London,

- 1952), 464. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 734. For telegrams between Roosevelt and Churchill on the matter, see PREM 3 (471), 349, 339, 338, 337.
86. Woodward, vol. iii, 546. He discusses the Hopkins trip on 546-51.
 87. For records of the discussions of Polish topics, see Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 887-912, and *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 299-338 passim.
 88. PREM 3 (356/13), 1155, telegram to FO, 1 June 1945.
 89. *Ibid.*, 1157, telegram, 1 June 1945. Also in *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 314. In spite of Hopkins's efforts, twelve of the sixteen were found guilty and given prison sentences ranging from four months to ten years. See Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, *The Pattern of Soviet Domination* (London, 1948), 145.
 90. PREM 3 (356/13), 1154, 2 June 1945.
 91. *Ibid.*, 1149, telegram, 2 June 1945.
 92. Campbell, formerly minister in Washington, was now HMG's representative to the European Advisory Commission.
 93. PREM 3 (356/13), 1144, minute, 3 June 1945.
 94. PREM 3 (356/13), 1103, or *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 321, telegram, Churchill to Truman, 4 June 1945.
 95. PREM 3 (356/13), 1107, telegram, 4 June 1945. Also in *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 320.
 96. PREM 3 (356/13), 1088, telegram, Kerr to FO, 6 June 1945.
 97. *Ibid.*, 1085, minute to Churchill, 8 June 1945.
 98. *Ibid.*, 1079, telegram, FO to Moscow Embassy, 9 June 1945.
 99. The quote is from a memorandum by Hopkins dated 13 June 1945. See Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 913, where Churchill's unsuccessful efforts to bring Hopkins to London are also described. *FRUS*, 1945, vol. v, 337, also presents the sections of this memorandum dealing with the Polish question and Churchill's reactions.
 100. PREM 3 (356/13), 1051.
 101. PREM 3 (473), 8, telegram.
 102. Woodward, vol. iii, 555-56.